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By Cynthia Ford
Last month, I wrote about prior inconsistent statements un-
der M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A).  For that type of evidence, the rule, the 
Comment, and the cases are fairly easy.  If a witness testifies on 
the stand differently from what she said outside the courtroom, 
her out-of-court inconsistent statement is admissible for both 
impeachment and substantive proof.  
This month’s subject, prior consistent statements under 
M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), is much less straightforward.  Whereas 
prior inconsistent statements are usually admissible, prior con-
sistent statements are not, and the law about when they might 
be is quite confusing.  The language of the Montana rule differs 
from the federal version and although the Montana Commission 
Comment indicates Montana wanted a similar rule with clearer 
language, the difference has mattered in some cases.  Further, 
the myriad Montana Supreme Court cases attempting to apply 
this Montana rule are, as we say technically, a mess.  It is little 
wonder that a judge recently called me for some help on this 
issue, and little wonder that I could not provide much.  I hope 
the research I have done on this issue will help some of you in 
current cases, and lead to some changes to make the law in this 
area clearer.
Background
Under the common law, and under the Montana and Federal 
Rules of Evidence, the general rule about prior consistent state-
ments is exactly the opposite of the rule about prior inconsistent 
statements.  Prior inconsistent statements under M.R.E. 801(d)
(1)(A) are admissible without restriction, both for impeach-
ment and substantive purposes.  (See the previous issue of The 
Montana Lawyer for more on this subject, and the difference 
between the Montana and federal rules on inconsistent state-
ments).  The presumption is that the prior consistent statements 
do not come in.  “Under common law, a witness could not be 
supported by evidence of prior consistent statements because no 
amount of repetition makes the story more probable. 4 Wigmore 
Evidence, Section 1124 (3rd ed. 1940).”  Montana Commission 
Comment to M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  
However, even at common law, a witness who was accused of 
lying on the stand for a specific reason could have her other con-
sistent statements admitted at trial if they were made before the 
alleged reason to lie occurred.  The Rules, federal and Montana, 
carried this approach forward, and allow prior consistent state-
ments to be admitted in some, but only a few, circumstances.  
When they are admissible, the prior consistent statements (like 
inconsistent statements) may be considered as substantive as 
well as rehabilitative evidence.
The M.R.E. Commission Comment to M.R.E. 801(d)(1) cites 
the federal Advisory Committee Note to F.R.E. 801(d)(1):
Subdivision (d)(1) deals with certain prior 
statements of the witness who is now testifying 
and subject to ideal conditions of oath, cross-
examination, and presence of the trier of fact. 
The Commission feels that the application of the 
conditions at the trial or hearing is sufficient to take 
these statements out of the hearsay rule, for requir-
ing their application at the time the statement was 
made would have the effect of excluding almost all 
prior statements. Therefore, these prior statements 
are admitted as substantive evidence. It should also 
be noted that the subdivision limits the types of 
prior statements placed outside the hearsay rule 
to three: This is a compromise between allow-
ing “general use of prior prepared statements 
as substantive evidence” which could lead to an 
abuse of preferring prepared statements to actual 
testimony, and allowing no prior statements to 
be admitted, which is not sensible, for “ ... par-
ticular circumstances call for a contrary result. The 
judgment is one more for experience than logic”. 
Advisory Committee’s Note, supra 56 F.R.D. at 
295. (Emphasis added).
Even though the Montana Evidence Commission quoted 
with approval the federal Advisory Committee Note to 801(d)(1)
(B), the Montana version of the prior consistent statement rule, 
801(d)(1)(B) is a bit different from exact wording of the federal 
rule. Here are the two current versions, with the language that 
differs from the other in bold:
F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B):
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A state-
ment that meets the following conditions is not 
hearsay:… (B) is consistent with the declarant’s 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or im-
plied charge that the declarant recently fabricated 
it or acted from a recent improper influence or 
motive in so testifying;
M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B):
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A state-
ment is not hearsay if: 
… the statement is ...(B) consistent with the 
declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an 
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express or implied charge against the declarant of 
subsequent fabrication, improper influence or 
motive…(Emphasis added).
The Montana Evidence Commission consciously changed 
the language of the F.R.E. version (which was then stylistically 
different from the 2011 version set out above) explaining:
“Clause 801(d)(1)(B) is not the same as the Federal Rule. It 
provides “ ... consistent with his testimony and his offer to rebut 
an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication 
or improper influence or motive ... ”. The clause deletes “recent” 
and “or” following fabrication so that it reads “ ... consistent 
with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against him of subsequent fabrication, improper influ-
ence or motive ... ”. The Commission changed the language of 
the Federal Rule to make the clause clearer.”
The Montana Comment indicates that the language  of 
M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) conformed to the then-existing state com-
mon law on admission of consistent statements, and mentions 
explicitly the requirement that the consistent statement must 
have been made before the grounds occurred which impeach 
the witness.  The Comment also notes that the rule expands the 
common law in one way only, that the prior statement now can 
be used for substantive evidence in addition to rehabilitation of 
the witness:
the common law does allow rehabilitation of a 
witness who has been impeached on the grounds 
mentioned in the clause. …The prior consistent 
statement is allowed to rehabilitate the witness 
because it was made prior to the existence of the 
impeaching evidence; that is, the consistent state-
ment is made and subsequently the impeaching 
evidence comes into existence. When a witness 
testifies consistently with these prior statements, 
it “ ... will effectively explain away the force of the 
impeaching evidence; because it is thus made to 
appear that the statement in the form now uttered 
was independent of discrediting influence”. 
…
Existing Montana law is consistent with and 
perhaps broader than the clause. The clause does 
change Montana law to the extent that it allows 
prior consistent statements to be admitted as 
substantive evidence. (Citations omitted, emphasis 
supplied).
The Commission mentioned three Montana cases (from 
1901,1903 and 1975) discussing the common law rule about 
prior consistent statements, noting that the first one had not 
actually applied the rule and the second had specifically declined 
to do so.  The third of the cases, though, did allow the prior con-
sistent statements into evidence.  The Commission observed:
this case is consistent with the language of the 
clause, although it may also be interpreted as ex-
pressing concern over which story is the truth and 
not when the stories were told. Dicta in that case 
also indicates that the court should allow rehabili-
tation by prior consistent statements with any form 
of impeachment. On these two points it is apparent 
that this case is broader than the clause.
Thus, the Montana Commission clearly intended to restrict 
use of prior consistent statements to limited situations where 
the witness has been impeached only on the specific grounds 
(“triggers”) listed in the rule, not just any form of impeachment.    
It also intended to implant a chronological requirement for the 
use of this exception to the general rule prohibiting consistent 
statements as hearsay.  Lastly,  the Commission intended the 
Montana version of the rule to do the same thing as the federal 
rule, only better.  
In its seminal case on this issue, the U.S.Supreme Court 
took the same view of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B):  prior consistent 
statements are admitted sparingly, only when specific types of 
impeachment have been asserted:
The Rules do not accord this weighty, nonhearsay status 
to all prior consistent statements. To the contrary, admissibil-
ity under the Rules is confined to those statements offered to 
rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive,” the same phrase used by the Advisory Committee in 
its description of the “traditiona[l]” common law of evidence, 
which was the background against which the Rules were drafted. 
See Advisory Committee’s Notes, supra, at 773. Prior consis-
tent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of 
impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has 
been discredited...(Emphasis added)
Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150, 157, 115 S.Ct. 696, 701 (1995).  
(More about Tome below).
The trigger can occur at any stage in the proceeding, 
whenever the opponent intimates that the witness’ 
testimony is the result of recent fabrication, improper 
influence, or improper motive
Federal “trigger” cases
The Federal Advisory Committee which first drafted Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) observed that, under the then-proposed rule, the 
blame for admission of a witness’ prior consistent statement lies 
at the door of the party opposing that witness’ testimony:  “if the 
opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evi-
dence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received 
generally.”  Advisory Committee’s Note, supra, 56 F.R.D. at 296.
Thus, a party who wishes to limit the impact of a witness’ 
testimony to the one statement in court should take care to avoid 
making any “express or implied charge” that the witness has 
recently fabricated his testimony, or “recently” became subject to 
an “improper influence or motive.”  As the federal cases illus-
trate, making such a charge “opens the door” to admission of the 
prior consistent statements, thus compounding the testimony 
of the witness.  The door can be opened by argument, as early as 
opening statement, as well as by cross examination.  Once it is 
opened, opposing counsel can bring in the consistent statements 
which occurred prior to the fabrication, improper influence or 
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improper motive.
Until the door is opened, those statements remain hearsay 
and are inadmissible.
In a recent 7th Circuit case, the defendant’s opening state-
ment told the jury that the codefendant had a plea agreement 
which rewarded him for testifying for the government.  Not only 
was the prosecutor allowed to bring in the consistent statement 
of the witness made prior to the plea agreement, he was allowed 
to do so on direct examination, thus “pulling the teeth” of the 
subsequent cross-examination.  
Foster clearly implied in his opening statement 
that Anderson would lie about Foster’s involvement 
in the robbery in order to curry favor with the gov-
ernment. By implying that Anderson’s plea agree-
ment gave him an incentive to lie, Foster opened 
the door to the admission of Anderson’s prior 
consistent statements on direct examination, 
before Foster had an opportunity to challenge 
Anderson’s credibility on cross-examination. 
See United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 756 (7th 
Cir.1991) (holding witness’s prior consistent state-
ment admissible in part because defense counsel 
implied during opening statement that witness had 
fabricated her testimony); United States v. LeBlanc, 
612 F.2d 1012, 1017 (6th Cir.1980) (holding wit-
ness’s prior consistent statement admissible where 
defense counsel implied in his opening statement 
that witness “should not be believed because of 
the favorable consideration he received from the 
government in his plea bargaining agreement”). 
Anderson’s prior consistent statement was not 
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), and the district 
court did not err.  (Emphasis added).  
U.S. v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 787 (C.A.7 
(Ill.),2011).  
The Ninth Circuit cases are to the same effect.  
In U.S. v. Stuart, for example, the defense lawyer 
called a FBI agent to testify about an inconsistent 
statement the witness had made in an interview.  
The 9th Circuit affirmed the trial judge’s admis-
sion of consistent statements made in the same 
interview:
The record in this case reveals that, prior to the 
agent’s testimony, Stuart had vigorously cross-ex-
amined Van de Water regarding his plea agreement 
with the Government, thereby calling into question 
Van de Water’s motive in testifying. Therefore, the 
introduction of prior consistent statements made 
prior to the plea agreement was proper.  United 
States v. Allen, 579 F.2d 531, 532-33 (9th Cir.1978) 
(prior consistent statements of a declarant made to 
an agent may be elicited from the agent under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) where defendant had sharply attacked 
the credibility of the declarant and implied that the 
declarant was testifying out of a motive to avoid 
criminal prosecution).
U.S. v. Stuart, 718 F.2d 931, 934-35 (9th 
Cir.,1983).  See also, U.S. v. Rinn, 586 F.2d 113 (9th 
Cir., 1978).
Montana “trigger” cases
The Montana rule and most of the Montana cases similarly 
require the opponent to state or imply that the witness’ testimony 
is the result of recent fabrication, motive or influence before the 
prior consistent statements can be admitted.  However, some of 
the older cases seem to have missed this requirement and allowed 
prior consistent statements in, just because some form of im-
peachment had occurred.  These cases violate both the letter and 
spirit of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), and should be overruled.
The most recent case is State v. McOmber, 340 Mont. 262, 
173 P. 3d 690 (2007).  McOmber was convicted of solicitation 
to issue a bad check. His friend, Bill Peltier, testified at trial for 
the prosecution.  He said on the stand that McOmber had been 
arrested for another charge, and had called Peltier to post bond 
for him.  When Peltier said he didn’t have enough money in his 
account to write a check, McOmber encouraged him to do so 
anyway, because McOmber would collect enough from other 
people to cover the check in the morning.  Those other people 
didn’t come through, Peltier’s check bounced, and Peltier was 
arrested on a bad check charge.  While in jail, Peltier first gave 
a written statement and then an oral interview.  His bad check 
charge was dropped to a misdemeanor, to which he pled guilty, 
and McOmber was charged with the felony solicitation.
After Peltier testified against McOmber, the prosecution tried 
to introduce both his written statement and the transcript of 
his interview. The defense counsel used the old “gilding the lily” 
objection, which actually gets to the common law rule that gener-
ally prior consistent statements are inadmissible hearsay (which 
would be a better phrase for your objection).  The trial judge 
overruled the objection, citing M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A).  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court laid out the general requirements for admis-
sion of prior consistent statements:
Under the rule, there are four requirements 
that must be met for a statement to be admissible as 
a prior consistent statement: 
 “(1) the declarant must testify at trial and (2) 
be subject to cross-examination concerning her 
statement, and (3) the statements to which the wit-
ness testifies must be consistent with the declarant’s 
testimony, and (4) the statement must rebut an 
express or implied charge of subsequent fabri-
cation, improper influence or motive.” State v. 
Teters, 2004 MT 137, ¶ 25, 321 Mont. 379, ¶ 25, 91 
P.3d 559, ¶ 25. (Emphasis supplied).
State v. McOmber, 2007 MT 340, 340 Mont. 
262, 266, 173 P.3d 690, 694-95. 
The Court found that the defense indeed alleged that Peltier 
was fabricating in order to obtain favorable treatment of his 
own felony charge, and that the charge was in fact dropped to a 
misdemeanor, so that there was a charge of improper influence 
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or motive.  Nonetheless, the Court found (harmless) error in the 
admission of the prior statements, on chronological grounds (see 
below), holding that the consistent statement was not “prior” to 
the alleged influence or motive.
State v. Teters, 2004 MT 137, 321 Mont. 379, 385-86, 91 P.3d 
559, 564, was a stepfather sexual abuse case.  (A lot of the 801(d)
(1)(B) cases, state and federal, arise in this context).  The victim 
testified, and the prosecution introduced her prior statement to a 
social worker.  The defendant objected, but lost both in trial and 
on appeal:
In the present case, defense counsel launched a general attack 
on J.U.’s credibility by insinuating that she possessed a motive 
to fabricate her testimony, and that she had been improperly 
influenced by her mother. Although implied, these charges of 
improper motive and influence were sufficient to satisfy the 
fourth requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid.
In contrast, in State v. Lunstad (1993), the child victim testi-
fied about the “private touch” by the defendant.  The prosecution 
then tried to admit the child’s four prior consistent statements to 
a therapist; the defendant objected on hearsay grounds and was 
sustained.  The prosecution then took another tack: when the 
defendant testified later, the prosecutor directly asked him on 
cross-examination whether he thought that the victim was lying.  
(There were no questions about any specific motive or influ-
ence for the alleged lies).  When he said “Yes,” the prosecution 
re-offered the prior consistent statements made by the victim to 
her therapist under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  The trial court bit and 
admitted the statements.  The Supreme Court found this to be 
reversible error:
Here, the State itself opened the door by directly asking 
Mr. Lunstad if C.H. was lying, and then attempted to bolster 
C.H.’s credibility by the admission of the very prior consistent 
statements that the district judge had ruled inadmissible 
hearsay in the State’s case-in-chief. The State cannot use this 
type of cross-examination to get evidence admitted which 
it could not get admitted prior to its cross-examination. We 
hold that it was an abuse of discretion and reversible error to 
allow the rebuttal testimony, in the form of prior consistent 
statements, to be presented on these facts.
State v. Lunstad, 259 Mont. 512, 516, 857 P.2d 723, 725-
26 (1993).  [But see, State v. Hart, 303 Mont. 71, 82, 15 P.3d 
917, 924 (2000), a non 801(d)(1)(B) case, where the Court 
distinguished Lunstad and stated: “We refuse to adopt a 
bright-line rule regarding the propriety of questioning 
the defendant about the truthfulness of other witnesses....
we commit the decision on whether to allow this type of 
questioning in any particular instance to the sound discretion 
of the district court.”]
Effect of error in admitting consistent statements 
which do not meet the requirements of 801(d)(1)(b)
Montana Approach
State v. Mensing was another sexual intercourse without 
consent case, this one decided in 1999.  Again, the victim testi-
fied at trial and the prosecution tried to introduce two additional 
statements she had given to the investigating officers, both 
substantially similar to her trial testimony.  The defense objected 
on hearsay grounds, but the trial judge admitted both statements 
under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  On appeal, the State argued that 
the defendant had implied fabrication by the victim, citing the 
defense cross-examination about how many times the victim had 
met with the prosecuting attorneys and questions pointing out 
inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony.  The Supreme Court 
held that the cross-examination merely attacked the victim’s 
overall credibility, and did not imply any specific motive for 
fabrication.  Therefore, the prior consistent statements were not 
admissible:
Here, Mensing only questioned Perry about 
inconsistencies in her story and implied that her 
memory was faulty as a result of drinking alcohol 
and smoking marijuana on the night in question. 
He did not question Perry regarding whether she 
had any reason to testify falsely. There was no 
charge-direct or implied-of a specific motive to fab-
ricate. Our review of the record does not support 
the State’s assertion that Mensing attacked Perry’s 
credibility in a manner sufficient to allow admis-
sion of her prior consistent statements.
¶ 17 We conclude that Mensing made no 
express or implied charge of fabrication, improper 
influence or motive against Perry during her cross-
examination and, as a result, the officers’ testimony 
regarding her prior statements was not admissible 
as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid. 
... Consequently, we further conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion in admitting 
the law enforcement officers’ hearsay testimony 
regarding Perry’s prior statements.
State v. Mensing, 1999 MT 303, 297 Mont. 172, 
176-77, 991 P.2d 950, 954.  
Mensing’s conviction was upheld, however, because the 
Court found the error to be harmless.  More startling, it indicat-
ed that wrongful admission of prior consistent statements would 
always be harmless error:
…a defendant is not prejudiced by the intro-
duction of inadmissible hearsay testimony when 
the hearsay statements are separately admitted 
through the testimony of the declarant or through 
other direct evidence. State v. Veis, 1998 MT 162, 
¶ 26, 289 Mont. 450, ¶ 26, 962 P.2d 1153, ¶ 26. 
Furthermore, where the declarant testifies at 
trial and the defendant is given the opportunity 
to cross-examine regarding the statements at 
issue, the improper admission of the declarant’s 
out-of-court statements is considered harmless. 
(Emphasis added).
State v. Mensing, 1999 MT 303, 297 Mont. 172, 
177, 991 P.2d 950, 954.   
(Mensing has been cited only once in Montana, and in a case 
where the prior consistent statement was held to be admissible.  
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However, its language has never been overruled.)
In Veis, cited by Mensing, the Court stated:
where hearsay testimony has been erroneously 
admitted, the defendant must have suffered preju-
dice as a result of the error to be entitled to have his 
conviction reversed. See State v. Stuit (1996), 277 
Mont. 227, 232, 921 P.2d 866, 869; State v. Riley 
(1995), 270 Mont. 436, 440, 893 P.2d 310, 313.
 ¶ 26 We have held that a defendant is not prej-
udiced by hearsay testimony when the statements 
that form the subject of the inadmissible hearsay 
are admitted elsewhere through the direct testi-
mony of the “out-of-court” declarant or by some 
other direct evidence. See Stuit, 277 Mont. at 232, 
921 P.2d at 869; State v. Graves (1995), 272 Mont. 
451, 460, 901 P.2d 549, 555; Riley, 270 Mont. at 
440, 893 P.2d at 313. Our holdings reflect the fact 
that when a defendant has the opportunity to cross-
examine a declarant because he or she is present at 
trial and testifies, the dangers that the hearsay rule 
seeks to avoid are not present and, therefore, hear-
say regarding the declarant’s out-of-court statement 
that is admitted during another witness’s testimony 
is harmless. See State v. Canon (1984), 212 Mont. 
157, 164, 687 P.2d 705, 709 (concluding that the 
testimony was not hearsay, but stating that even 
if it had been, there would have been no prejudice 
because “the defendant had all of the necessary op-
portunity to protect himself by cross-examination 
of [the declarant].”). 
(Emphasis added).
…
¶ 28 Here, in the District Court trial both of the 
boys testified prior to Dugan-Laemmle’s testimony. 
Each of them identified Veis as their abuser. In 
addition, S.J. identified the letter and list of names 
that he had written during his therapy and de-
scribed both the directions he had been given by 
Dugan-Laemmle when asked to write them and the 
content of his writings. He testified that in both the 
letter and the list he explicitly identified Veis as his 
abuser. Veis had full opportunity to cross-examine 
both boys. At no point during his cross-exami-
nation of S.J. or B.J. did Veis challenge the boys’ 
identification of Veis as their abuser. Accordingly, 
Dugan-Laemmle’s hearsay testimony about the 
boys’ identification of their abuser during therapy 
was simply cumulative of the boys’ own testimony 
and did not deny Veis the opportunity to confront 
his accusers.
State v. Veis, 1998 MT 162, 289 Mont. 450,  457-
458, 962 P.2d 1153, 1157.
Wow! The language in these two cases, Veis and Mensing,  
amounts to a judicial rewrite of Rule 801(d), in effect saying all 
prior statements of a witness are admissible, or at least that there 
will be no consequence for their admission.  This, in turn, directly 
contravenes the intent of the Montana Evidence Commission 
which drafted the restrictive language of Rule 801(d), as well as 
the intent of the Federal Advisory Committee, as expressed in the 
Notes to F.R.E. 801(d).
Federal approach
Compare this approach with that of the federal courts.  In 
Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150, 157, 115 S.Ct. 696, 701 (1995), the 
U.S. Supreme Court remanded a father’s conviction for sexual 
abuse of his daughter precisely because of the admission of the 
victim’s prior consistent statements.  (This case is discussed in 
more detail in the next section).  On remand, the 10th Circuit 
held that some of the statements were admissible under Rule 
803(4), but that the statements made by the girl to her mother, 
her babysitter, and a social worker did not meet the requirements 
of 801(d)(1)(B) in view of the Supreme Court decision, nor did 
they fulfill any hearsay exception, and were inadmissible.  The 
court went on to hold that the admission of these statements was 
not harmless, and reversed the conviction.  
Montana should enforce 801(d)(1)(B)
If the Montana rule is to actually mean what it says, the 
Montana Supreme Court should take another look at its enforce-
ability.  If a prior consistent statement is not admissible, but 
there is no potential reversal if it is admitted, it is a rare advocate 
who would back away from using it, and perhaps a rare judge 
who would strictly enforce the rule if a possible error is “always 
harmless.”  
Chronology requirement: Both the montana and 
federal versions of 801(d)(1)(b) allude to an additional 
timing relationship requirement, once the trigger has 
been pulled
The F.R.E. version states:  “consistent with the declarant’s 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent 
improper influence or motive in so testifying;”
The M.R.E. version is:  “consistent with the declarant’s testi-
mony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against 
the declarant of subsequent fabrication, improper influence or 
motive…” (Emphasis added).
U.S. Supreme Court  
“Required Chronology” case is clear: 
The United States Supreme Court took cert in 1995 to resolve 
a conflict between the federal circuits on the exact requirements 
of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  In Tome v. U.S., the witness was 6 years 
old when she testified, very haltingly, about her father’s sexual 
acts with her.  (Observing her demeanor on the stand, the trial 
judge observed “We have a very difficult situation here.”)  The 
parents were divorced and engaged in a custody battle in tribal 
court.  The defendant’s theory was that his daughter fabricated 
her story in order to be able to remain with her mother at the 
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end of her summer visit, even though the tribal court order in 
place gave the accused father physical custody.
The trial judge admitted six prior statements of the young 
victim, made prior to trial to a babysitter, the mother, a social 
worker, and three pediatricians.  The 10th Circuit affirmed all six 
admissions, following the flexible “balancing” approach used in 
the 9th Circuit to the “subsequent” language in 801(d)(1)(B).  
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, and held that 
prior consistent statements are inadmissible unless they predate 
the alleged reason to alter the testimony:
The prevailing common-law rule for more than a century 
before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence was that a prior 
consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive was admissible if 
the statement had been made before the alleged fabrication, 
influence, or motive came into being, but it was inadmissible 
if made afterwards. As Justice Story explained: “[W]here the 
testimony is assailed as a fabrication of a recent date, ... in order 
to repel such imputation, proof of the antecedent declaration of 
the party may be admitted.” Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 
412, 439, 9 L.Ed. 475 (1836) (emphasis added). See also People v. 
Singer, 300 N.Y. 120, 124–125, 89 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1949).
McCormick and Wigmore stated the rule in a more categori-
cal manner: “[T]he applicable principle is that the prior consis-
tent statement has no relevancy to refute the charge unless the 
consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, in-
terest, influence or incapacity originated.” E. Cleary, McCormick 
on Evidence § 49, p. 105 (2d ed. 1972) (hereafter McCormick). 
See also 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1128, p. 268 (J. Chadbourn 
rev. 1972) (hereafter Wigmore) (“A consistent statement, at a 
time prior to the existence of a fact said to indicate bias ... will 
effectively explain away the force of the impeaching evidence” 
(emphasis in original)). The question is whether Rule 801(d)(1)
(B) embodies this temporal requirement. We hold that it does.
Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150, 156, 115 S.Ct. 696, 700 (1995). 
(Emphasis added).
Montana “Required Chronology”  
cases are not so clear
Although many other states have distinguished or outright 
disagreed with Tome in interpreting their own versions of the 
hearsay rule, the Montana Supreme Court has cited it with ap-
proval on several occasions. 
In State v. Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140, 158, 948 P.2d 186, 197 
(1997), where the Supreme Court ultimately held that the dis-
puted evidence was inconsistent with the trial testimony, it first 
commented about the requirements for admission of consistent 
statements:
Appellant correctly states that in order to introduce a wit-
ness’s prior consistent statements, the proponent must first lay 
the necessary foundation as outlined in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and 
State v. Lunstad (1993), 259 Mont. 512, 517, 857 P.2d 723, 726 
(holding that a declarant’s prior consistent out-of-court state-
ments are admissible only when those statements were made 
before the alleged fabrication, improper influence, or motive 
arose). See also,Tome v. United States (1995), 513 U.S. 150, 115 
S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574.  (Emphasis added)
Just a year later, though, the Court inexplicably dismissed an 
argument on appeal based on Tome:  “He cites Tome v. United 
States (1995), 513 U.S. 150... In Tome, the Court interpreted 
Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), which is different from Rule 801(d)(1)
(B), M.R.Evid.”  State v. Johnson, 288 Mont. 513, 524, 958 P.2d 
1182, 1189 (1998).  This is an area where Montana trial judges 
and lawyers need more consistent guidance from the Montana 
Supreme Court.
The existing Montana cases divide into two camps: those 
where the witness’ consistent statement was made before, and 
those where the consistent statement was made after, the alleged 
reason to lie (or at least shade testimony) came into existence.  
Cases where the prior statement was admissible  
non-hearsay,  because it predated the alleged  
reason to lie
In State v. Teters (2004), discussed above, the stepdaughter 
victim testified at trial about the defendant’s sexual abuse of 
her.  The trial judge later allowed evidence of her prior consis-
tent statements through the testimony of a representative of the 
Utah Dept. of Child and Family Services, who had interviewed 
the victim.  The Supreme Court held this was proper, because 
the defense counsel had suggested in opening statement that 
the girl was lying to help her mother in a “messy divorce.” The 
interview occurred well before the spouses separated, so there 
was no “messy divorce” when the prior statement was made.  The 
chronology (statement, then messy divorce proceedings, then 
testimony consistent with the statement)  thus met the require-
ment that the prior consistent statement occur prior to the al-
leged motive to fabricate:
In State v. Lunstad (1993), 259 Mont. 512, 
516, 857 P.2d 723, 726, we emphasized that prior 
consistent statements are admissible only when 
a specific motive to fabricate is alleged and the 
prior consistent statements were made before the 
time the alleged motive to fabricate arose.
¶ 28 Furthermore, the consistent statements 
were made prior to the time the alleged motivation 
to fabricate arose. See Lunstad, 259 Mont. at 516, 
857 P.2d at 726. In his opening statement, defense 
counsel implied that J.U. had been subject to the 
improper influence of her mother, who was in the 
midst of a “messy divorce” from Teters. However, 
J.U.’s statements to Burdette occurred prior to the 
parties’ separation in April 2001, and well be-
fore the commencement of divorce proceedings. 
Accordingly, J.U.’s statements were made prior to 
the alleged motivation to fabricate arose, and are 
admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid. 
We therefore hold the District Court did not err 
in admitting Burdette’s testimony concerning 
J.U.’s prior consistent statements of sexual abuse. 
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(Emphasis added).
State v. Teters, 2004 MT 137, 321 Mont. 379, 
385-86, 91 P.3d 559, 564.
State v. Sheffelman (1991) is another sexual abuse case.  Its 
holding is as messy as its facts.  In her opening, the prosecutor 
alluded to the girl’s prior consistent and inconsistent statements 
and indicated that the girl told her story to prevent her stepfather 
from returning to the home and continuing the molestation.  The 
prosecution was later able to introduce the prior consistent state-
ments into evidence, over the defendant’s objection.  
The Supreme Court affirmed the admission of those state-
ments.  First, it observed that both the prosecution and defense 
openings had discussed possible  motives for the girl to falsify 
testimony.  On direct examination, the prosecution introduced 
several inconsistent statements she had made.  The defendant 
cross-examined the girl, and intimated that she had been subject 
to improper influence from the prosecutor.  The prosecution was 
then permitted to introduce several witnesses who testified about 
out of court statements the victim had made to them which were 
consistent with her trial testimony.  The Court distinguished be-
tween the impeachment of “you have been lying all along” from 
“you are lying because the prosecutor influenced you”:
The defendant claims he does not assert a sub-
sequent fabrication on the part of the victim, but 
that she was fabricating or lying all along. Generally 
speaking, if this were true, prior consistent state-
ments would not be admitted. However, given the 
fact that the defense implied improper influence on 
the part of the prosecuting attorney in cross exam-
ining the victim, we hold that her prior consistent 
statements in this case were properly admitted. 
State v. Scheffelman, 250 Mont. 334, 339, 820 
P.2d 1293, 1296 (1991).
Acknowledging that some jurisdictions (notably Colorado 
and New Mexico) have given up the chronological requirement, 
and allow all prior statements in, without regard to their tim-
ing relative to the alleged motive or influence to fabricate, the 
Montana Supreme Court decided to join the majority of jurisdic-
tions which retained the common law approach:
Most jurisdictions still look to the time that the statement was 
made in order to address concerns of relevancy, however. These 
jurisdictions hold that in order to be relevant, a prior consistent 
statement must be made before the declarant has a motive to fab-
ricate. If a declarant makes consistent statements after the motive 
to fabricate arises, the relevancy of those statements under Rules 
402 and 403, M.R.Evid, is lost because they have no bearing upon 
truthfulness or veracity. See e.g. United States v. Miller, (9th 
Cir.1989), 874 F.2d 1255, 1272...
We believe that the most logical view is that held by the 
Ninth Circuit. As described above, this view requires the prior 
consistent statement to be made before any motive to fabri-
cate has arisen. This view is most in line with the traditional 
common law and with common sense notions of relevancy.  
(Emphasis added).
250 Mont. at 340-314, 820 P.2d at 1297.
The problem with Sheffelman lies in its application of this 
theory to its facts. The Court affirmed admission of the consistent 
statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), holding that:
According to Scheffelman, the victim’s prior statements 
should not have been admitted because she had a motive to fabri-
cate when they were made. However, according to the testimony, 
the victim’s motive for fabrication was that she did not want 
Scheffelman to return to the family household and continue his 
pattern of abuse. This reason cannot be considered a motive to 
fabricate. Rather, it is inherently intertwined with the truth or 
falsity of the charge of the crime itself. It may provide the impe-
tus to report the defendant’s abuse, but it does not evidence any 
motive to lie or fabricate. Therefore, we hold no error was com-
mitted in allowing the prior consistent statements into evidence.
250 Mont. at 341, 820 P.2d at 1297.  
Justice Trieweiler filed a separate opinion in which he con-
curred with the holding admitting the prior consistent state-
ments, but simply said “I do not agree with all that is said in 
the majority’s discussion of prior consistent statements.”  (The 
bulk of his opinion dissented about an issue of expert witness 
qualifications).  
If the girl’s motive was to prevent her stepfather’s return, 
that motive existed at the first time she spoke about the abuse, 
and so the consistent statements are all subsequent, not prior to, 
the existence of her alleged motive.  The only logical way to read 
Sheffelman, although the Court did not articulate this specifi-
cally, is to parse the language of the rule (“offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against the declarant of subsequent 
fabrication, improper influence or motive…”) so that the word 
“subsequent” modifies only “fabrication,” and  thus there is no 
temporal requirement for that prior consistent statements of-
fered to rebut any implication of improper influence or motive.  
Although this interpretation is grammatically possible, it does 
not comport either with the common law or the Tome approach.  
In Lunstad, the Court discussed but distinguished Sheffelman; its 
description of Sheffelman is somewhat clearer than the original 
case itself:
[In Sheffelman] Court held that a prior consis-
tent statement was allowable if it was made before 
any motive to fabricate had arisen. However, if a 
defendant does not assert that the victim is subse-
quently fabricating her story, but claims, as in this 
case, she was lying all along, prior consistent state-
ments are not admissible. Scheffelman, 820 P.2d at 
1296. In Scheffelman, the Court held that, because 
the defendant alleged the victim was improperly 
influenced, no error was committed in allowing the 
prior consistent statements into evidence under 
Rule 801. Scheffelman, 820 P.2d at 1296 .
State v. Lunstad, 259 Mont. 512, 517, 857 P.2d 
723, 726 (1993).  
Two years later, the Court acknowledged its improvement 
of Scheffelman, and reaffirmed its commitment to the 
chronologic requirement:  
We interpreted Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid., in 
Scheffelman and refined that interpretation in State 
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v. Lunstad (1993)... . We emphasized in Lunstad 
that prior consistent statements are admissible only 
when a specific motive to fabricate is alleged and 
the prior consistent statements were made before 
the time the alleged motive to fabricate arose. 
Lunstad, 857 P.2d at 726.
State v. Fina, 273 Mont. 171, 182, 902 P.2d 30, 
37 (1995).  
The Court observed that, although the defendant wanted 
to admit the consistent out-of-court statements of the defense 
witnesses:
Fina does not establish that any specific motive to fabricate 
was raised at trial regarding any of the witnesses whose state-
ments are at issue here. He also does not establish that any ex-
press or implied charge was raised that any or all of the witnesses 
were improperly influenced or had improper motives.
273 Mont. at182, 902 P.2d at 37.  
Fina did not identify on appeal any impeachment by the 
prosecution which would trigger 801(d)(1)(B); indeed, he did 
not identify any particular witness or any particular out of court 
statement which would qualify for non-hearsay treatment.  
Therefore, 801(d)(1)(B) did not apply, and the consistent state-
ments remained inadmissible hearsay.
The Lunstad/Fina gloss on Sheffelman helps, but not enough.  
The Montana Supreme Court cited Lunstad in a 1998 case which 
confuses the issue even more.   State v. Johnson is another sexual 
assault case.  This time the defendant was not a family member, 
and the victim was an adult.  She claimed that, instead of giving 
her the promised ride home, Johnson drove her to an isolated 
trail outside Hamilton and raped her. The defense theory was 
that the intercourse was consensual, and that the victim concoct-
ed the rape story afterwards to maintain her relationship with her 
boyfriend and another man (the Supreme Court described this as 
“hiding her promiscuity from others”).
The victim gave a lengthy interview to the police after she 
was rescued by passers-by.  There were two versions of the typed 
transcript, which led to confusion at trial because the defendant 
had a version which the victim had annotated in handwriting, 
which somehow the prosecution did not have.  Johnson’s lawyer 
used the annotated version to impeach the victim during her 
cross-examination, and may have adduced some of the same 
statements during the detective’s cross-examination as well (the 
case is not clear on this point).  The State then offered the whole 
transcript into evidence “under Rule 801(d)(1), M.R.Evid., as 
either a prior consistent or prior inconsistent statement.”  
State v. Johnson, 288 Mont. 513, 522, 958 P.2d 1182, 1188 
(1998).  The confusion lay in exact words the victim handwrote 
in the transcript: “I kept going back and forth.”  The defense 
claimed this meant that she was physically going back and forth, 
voluntarily participating in the encounter with pleasure; the 
victim explained that this phrase described her mental state, al-
ternating between scared and furious, which would be consistent 
with her testimony.
The trial judge chose the consistent statement approach, and 
admitted the transcript under 801(d)(1)(B).  Both sides discussed 
the prior statement in their closings: the prosecutor argued that it 
was “not that inconsistent” with her testimony, while the defense 
argued that it was very different from what she said on the stand 
and supported the defense theory that she had fabricated the 
story all along.  On appeal, the defendant cited both Tome and 
Lundstad.  The Court dismissed Tome in a single observation 
that the federal version was different from M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) 
(which did not refer at all to the Commission’s express desire to 
emulate and clarify the federal rule); see above. The Court then 
went on to cite with approval the Lunstad principle that if the 
defendant alleges the victim has been lying from the start, there 
is no “subsequent” fabrication, so consistent out of court state-
ments are not admissible.  The Court’s next two paragraphs are 
both confused and confusing:
¶ 45 In this case, the prior statement in the 
annotated transcription may have had general 
impeachment value to the defense, but ... nothing 
in it supported Johnson’s theory that the victim 
was concocting the rape to hide her promiscuity 
from others. The prior statement thus provided no 
independent basis for defense counsel to question 
the victim about a “motive to lie all along,” but was 
relevant only to suggest that the victim’s overall 
credibility was suspect because of her various state-
ments concerning the rape.
 ¶ 46 The annotated statement was initially 
brought before the jury by the defense, for purposes 
of impeachment. The defense attempted to use the 
annotated transcription as a prior inconsistent state-
ment by the victim. Under that argument, the an-
notated transcription would have had to predate the 
motive to lie.  But, as the District Court noted, the 
victim’s statements in the annotated transcription 
proved to be fairly consistent with her trial testimo-
ny. A prior consistent statement which predates the 
motive to lie is admissible into evidence. Therefore, 
we conclude that the State was thereafter entitled 
to utilize the statement as a prior consistent state-
ment to rehabilitate the witness, and the annotated 
transcription was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)
(B), M.R.Evid.
State v. Johnson, 288 Mont. 513, 524, 958 P.2d 
1182, 1189 (1998).  
Obviously, the Court made perhaps a typographical error, but 
its confusion between the requirements for prior consistent v. 
prior inconsistent statements deepens the murk.
In State v. Hibbs (1989), four young girls accused their 58 
year old neighbor of forcing them to perform sexual acts on him.  
All four of them testified at trial.  After they had testified, the 
prosecutor was allowed to call two of their mothers and a social 
worker, who testified about prior consistent statements made by 
the girls.  The defendant objected to all the consistent statements 
as hearsay, but was overruled.    The Supreme Court 
affirmed their admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), citing the de-
fense attack on the credibility of the girls, but acknowledging that 
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it was a general attack that they did not know the difference be-
tween fantasy and truth.  In opening, defense counsel warned the 
jury: “Be sure...the children...know the difference between truth 
and fantasy, between the truth and a lie.”  In his cross-examina-
tions of them, he continued with this theme:  “he questioned the 
children repeatedly (original emphasis) over whether they knew 
what a lie was and whether they had ever lied.”  The Court held: 
“In asking such questions, defense counsel placed the credibility 
of the child witnesses in issue,”  State v. Hibbs, 239 Mont. 308, 
313, 780 P.2d 182, 185 (1989), and therefore their prior consis-
tent statements were admissible to rebut the attack on the wit-
nesses’ credibility.  There was no analysis at all about the chrono-
logical relationship between the alleged fabrication and the out of 
court statements, nor any identification of any improper motive 
or influence, both of which appear to be necessary under the 
plain language of the rule.  The lesson from Hibbs seems to be 
that if the opponent attacks the credibility of any witness in any 
way, all prior consistent statements of that witness made out of 
court are admissible.  This simply does not comport with either 
the plain language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or the Comments of the 
Montana Evidence Commission to that rule.  
Cases where the prior statement was inadmissible 
hearsay because it did not predate the alleged reason 
to lie
 In State v. McOmber, 340 Mont. 262, 173 P. 3d 690 (2007), 
discussed earlier, the defense clearly triggered 801(d)(1)(B) when 
it cross-examined witness Bill Peltier about the plea bargain he 
received for a related charge, implying he shaded his testimony 
against McOmber in return, an “improper motive” or “improper 
influence.”  After Peltier testified against McOmber, the prosecu-
tion offered as exhibits both Peltier’s written statement and the 
transcript of his interview, both made while he was in jail.  The 
defense counsel used the old “gilding the lily” objection, which 
actually gets to the common law rule that generally prior con-
sistent statements are not admissible (which would be a better 
phrase for your objection).  The trial judge overruled the objec-
tion, citing M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), and admitted both statements.  
The Supreme Court found this was error, on a chronological 
ground:
¶ 15 We have previously held that the prior 
consistent statement rule “only applies when the 
declarant’s in-court testimony has been impeached 
by another party’s allegations of subsequent 
fabrication, improper influence, or motive.” State 
v. Lunstad, 259 Mont. 512, 515, 857 P.2d 723, 725 
(1993). In addition, to qualify as a prior consis-
tent statement under M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), the 
statement must have been made before the alleged 
motive to fabricate arose. Teters, ¶ 27; State v. 
Veis, 1998 MT 162, ¶ 24, 289 Mont. 450, ¶ 24, 962 
P.2d 1153, ¶ 24 (citing Tome v. U.S., 513 U.S. 150, 
167, 115 S.Ct. 696, 705, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995)). 
(Emphasis added).
State v. McOmber, 2007 MT 340, 340 Mont. 262, 267, 173 
P.3d 690, 695.   The timing of the prior statements and the 
motive to lie was critical:
Crucially, as to the requirement that the state-
ments were made prior to the time the alleged 
motive to fabricate arose, McOmber claims this 
requirement was not met and, therefore, the ex-
hibits’ admission was in error. The State charged 
Peltier with the felony count of issuing a bad check 
on December 2, 2003, and he was arrested in 
February 2004 on that charge. While incarcerated 
in the Powell County jail, Peltier made his written 
statement on February 18, 2004, and the interview 
with Captain George took place the following 
day.  McOmber maintains that Peltier’s motive 
to fabricate existed prior to the time he made his 
statements to Captain George—i.e., the motive 
arose when Peltier was arrested. We agree with 
McOmber’s assertion. Given that Peltier’s prior 
consistent statements were made after he had been 
charged and jailed on the felony charge, it is clear 
that the alleged motive to fabricate arose before he 
made those statements.
State v. McOmber, 2007 MT 340, 340 Mont. 
262, 267-68, 173 P.3d 690, 695.  The admission of 
the prior statements was error.1
State v. Maier was a1999 case, involving attempted homicide.  
One of the shooting victims was Robert Bradford. He testified at 
trial, identifying Maier as the shooter.  The defense cross-exam-
ined to the effect that Bradford first found out “around town” 
who had been arrested for the shooting, and then went to the 
police and told them it was Maier.  The prosecutor was allowed 
to call the detective who recounted Bradford’s out-of-court state-
ment that Maier was the shooter.  The Supreme Court concluded 
that this was an inappropriate use of 801(d)(1)(B) because of 
the timing of the alleged motive to fabricate and the out of court 
statement:
¶ 38 We conclude that Detective Hollis’ testi-
mony concerning what Bradford told him about the 
identity of the shooter was not a prior consistent 
statement. In State v. Lunstad (1993), 259 Mont. 
512, 857 P.2d 723, this Court held that Rule 801(d)
(1)(B) “only applies when the declarant’s in-court 
testimony has been impeached by another party’s 
allegations of subsequent fabrication, improper 
influence, or motive.” Lunstad, 259 Mont. at 515, 
857 P.2d at 725. The Lunstad Court further held 
that prior consistent statements must be made be-
fore a declarant’s alleged motive to fabricate arose. 
Lunstad, 259 Mont. at 516, 857 P.2d at 726.
¶ 39 In the present case, Maier’s cross-examina-
tion of Bradford clearly suggested that Bradford’s 
motive to fabricate arose as soon as he learned of 
Maier’s arrest:
Q. So isn’t it true that you didn’t see who was 
1  The Court held, however, that this trial error was harmless, and the conviction 
stood.
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sitting in there shooting at you-
...
Q. That you ran around town trying to get the 
name of who was sitting in that seat shooting at 
you. And once you got the name, because Mr. Maier 
had been arrested, you went in to the police and you 
told them, Mr. Maier is the one that was shooting at 
me? Isn’t that true?
A. No. I seen who it was. I just went around 
and tried to find out to verify my mind before I 
start accusing someone.
Bradford testified that he thought he had talked 
to police about Maier several days after Maier was 
arrested. We conclude that Bradford’s statement 
was not a prior consistent statement under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid., because he made it after 
his alleged motive to fabricate arose.
State v. Maier, 1999 MT 51, 293 Mont. 403, 412, 
977 P.2d 298, 305.  Once again, though, the Court 
held that this error was harmless.
Similarly, in State v.Veis, 289 Mont. 450, 962 P.2d 1153 
(1998), the defense theory was that the young victims had been 
sexually abused but by someone other than Veis.  In support of 
that theory, the defense introduced a note which one of the boys 
had written, indicating that he had been raped by his father (who 
was not Veis).  The boy’s explanation was that the note was false, 
but he had written it to work up his courage to report Veis’ abuse. 
The prosecutor then called the boys’ therapist, who recounted 
what the boys had said about their abuser during therapy ses-
sions.  The Supreme Court held this evidence to be hearsay, 
outside the non-hearsay definition of 801(b)(1)(B):
in order for a statement to be admissible as a 
prior consistent statement pursuant to Rule 801(d)
(1)(B), M.R.Evid., it must, among other things, 
have been made before the declarant had a motive 
to fabricate. See Tome v. United States (1995), 513 
U.S. 150, 167, 115 S.Ct. 696, 705, 130 L.Ed.2d 574, 
588; State v. Lunstad (1993), 259 Mont. 512, 517, 
857 P.2d 723, 726. Here, based on Veis’s theory of 
defense, S.J.’s motive to fabricate his accusations 
about Veis existed prior to the time that he revealed 
during therapy to Dugan-Laemmle that Veis was 
his abuser. Accordingly, testimony from Dugan-
Laemmle regarding who S.J. identified during the 
exercises constitutes hearsay that is not admissible 
as a prior consistent statement.
State v. Veis, 1998 MT 162, 289 Mont. 450, 962 
P.2d 1153, 1156-57. (However, here again the Court 
went on to hold that the error in admitting the 
hearsay testimony was harmless; see above).
State v. Lunstad was actually decided on “trigger” grounds, 
the Supreme Court holding that the prosecutor can’t create the 
impeachment of its own witness on cross-examination of the 
defense witnesses, as a pretext to admit prior consistent state-
ments.  (See above).  However, the Court went on to discuss the 
chronology requirements, and held that the statement did not 
qualify for admission under 801(d)(1)(B) anyway:
[W]e also hold that the statements of C.H. were 
not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), M.R.Evid., 
because such statements were not made prior to the 
time C.H.’s alleged motive to fabricate arose. In this 
case, Mr. Lunstad claimed that C.H. threatened to 
tell her father about the touch if Mr. Lunstad would 
not give her a piggy back ride. The only possible 
motive to fabricate suggested by Mr. Lunstad was 
the fact that C.H. was angered at him for refusing 
her the piggy back ride. Therefore, any “motive” 
arose on November 4, 1991, the day C.H. allegedly 
made that statement to Mr. Lunstad. Any state-
ments C.H. made after that date, including state-
ments to her father (November 4, 1991), the police 
officer (November 5 and 6, 1991), and her coun-
selor (January, 1992), could not be prior consistent 
statements, because they were made subsequent to 
the time C.H.’s alleged motive to fabricate arose. 
Therefore, C.H.’s statements were not admissible as 
prior consistent statements as contemplated by Rule 
801(d)(1)(B)...
259 Mont. 512, 516-17, 857 P.2d 723, 726 (1993).
Conclusion
It is time to clean up this troublesome area of Montana evi-
dence law.  The easiest way to do that is to change the language of 
the rule itself so that it conforms exactly with the current ver-
sion of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  The recent stylistic amendments to 
the F.R.E. substantially improved 801(d)(1)(B) by repeating the 
temporal requirement for both types of impeachment: “offered 
to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently 
fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or 
motive in so testifying.”  This is the best way to accomplish the 
original intent of the Montana Commission to retain the com-
mon law disfavor of out-of-court consistent statements, while 
allowing those few which actually counter specific accusations of 
improper influence on a witness’ testimony.
When the change is made, the Montana Commission 
Comment to the new version of the rule can reiterate the general 
rule (that prior consistent statements are inadmissible hearsay) 
and clarify the specific requirements for the few exceptions to 
that rule.  At the same time, the Montana Supreme Court should 
acknowledge and resolve its prior inconsistent applications of 
M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), so that both trial judges and trial lawyers 
clearly understand when a statement qualifies for admission 
under the rule.  The Court should also clarify the divergence in 
its opinions, some of which seem to state categorically that error 
in admitting prior consistent statements which do not qualify for 
the non-hearsay definition is always harmless and not a ground 
for reversal.  (On the other hand, the Court could choose to af-
firm its occasional statement that all prior consistent statements 
are admissible, as a few other states have done, which would be 
another way to solve the problem.  If the Court chooses this ap-
proach, the M.R.E. should be amended accordingly, so that the 
rule and the case law are consistent).
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